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RECENT CASES
the effect that, where there has been a conspiracy to violate more
than one statute, a trial for conspiracy to violate one does not bar a
prosecution for a conspiracy to violate the others.2 Respectable authority may, however, be found to support a view to the contrary."
In the foregoing cases the courts have been unable to formulate a
hard and fast rule which will guarantee justice in all situations. Although the "same evidence" test is probably the better rule for deciding identity of offenses in most criminal cases, it is possible that
an application of the "same transaction" test would produce better results in conspiracy cases. As pointed out in the Short case, the prosecution is for the criminal agreement or transaction and not for the
specific overt acts. Since the prosecution is for the agreement, a slight
divergence in the evidence or the time, place, parties, overt acts, or
statutes violated should not give rise to numerous prosecutions for the
same conspiracy.
The question of identity of offenses involving divergent factual situations does not lend itself to determination -by strict rules of law. It
is probable that more just results would be obtained by freeing the
courts from such rules and allowing them discretion in deciding the
question on the basis of broad principles of public policy.' However,
the court in the principal case is correct in placing on the defendant
the burden of proving that the former prosecution was for the same
offense" and in holding that the defendant will not be heard to criticize a judgment which he insisted should be granted.'
Wilmar Pewsey

TORTS-ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE-ARTIFICIAL POOLS OF
WATER AS ATTRACTIVE NUISANCES. Defendant, a land owner
in an area frequented by children, dug an uneven excavation near a
public street. He allowed water to collect, thus creating a pond varying in depth from a few inches to more than eight feet. P's son, an
eleven-year-old boy, was drowned while wading in the pool when he
stepped into a depression. P sued for damages on the theory the pond
was an attractive nuisance. In dismissing the suit, the Supreme Court
of Indiana held, with two judges dissenting,' that such artificial pools
Lewis v. United States, 4 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1925); United States v.
Owen, 21 F.2d 868 (N.D. Ill.
1927).
-1 Manning v. United States. 275 Fed. 29 (8th Cir. 1921); United States
v. Weiss, 293 Fed. 992 (N.D. Ill. 1923).
-Hall, op. cit. supra note 9, at 908.
Johnson v. United States, 124 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1941); Kastel v. United
States, 23 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1927).
'
Haugen v. United States, 153 F.2d 850, 851 (9th Cir. 1946); United
States v. Jones, 31 Fed. 725 (S.D. Ga. 1887).
The dissenting judges stated that when there is an affirmative act done
by man which creates a body of water, that man must use due care under
the circumstances to avoid injury to others. The excavation attracted the
infant and there was a duty on the part of the defendant to act affirmatively to avoid injury. The condition was likened to a trap.
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are similar to natural bodies of water and do not therefore constitute
attractive nuisances. Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co., 92 N.E.2d 632 (Ind.
1950.)
An elementary statement of the attractive nuisance doctrine is that
one who maintains on his property a dangerous instrumentality or
object which reasonably can be expected to attract children is under
a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them.' The courts have
laid down four conditions as prerequisites to liability: (1) the land
owner must know or be reasonably chargeable with knowledge that
the children will trespass upon the property; (2) the land owner must
know or be reasonably chargeable with knowledge that the condition
involves unreasonable risk to children; (3) the condition must be
such that it will not be discovered or the risk appreciated by the
children due to their inexperience; (4) the attractive condition must
be of slight utility to the possessor as compared with the risk borne
by the children.'
The majority of jurisdictions, however, do not apply the attractive
nuisance doctrine to ponds, pools, streams, and other bodies of water.'
These jurisdictions have abandoned the distinction between the natural bodies of water which are classed as acts of God for which there
is no liability, and artificial ponds created by man.' The structures of
artificial and natural bodies of water, the courts have stated, resemble
each other to such a degree that the dangers involved in an artificial
pond are no greater than in a natural one.' Consequently, there should
be no liability for the maintenance of artificial ponds any more than
for natural ones. Also children are ordinarily instructed at an early
age concerning the dangers of lakes and rivers so that the injuries
resulting from them are comparatively rare.' These cases which have
refused to extend the doctrine of attractive nuisance to artificial bodies
of water have proceeded, in some instances, upon the theory that to
impose liability upon the owners of land would create hardship because of the widespread use of artificial ponds.
The dissenting justices in the instant case, with considerable logic,
characterize reasons such as the foregoing as "ativistic" and "dog2

4

Railroad Company v. Stout, 17 Wall 657 (U.S. 1873); Morse v. Douglas,
107 Cal. App. 196, 290 Pac. 465 (1930); Stark v. Holtzclaw, 90 Fla.
207, 105 So. 330 (1925); Siddall v. Jansen, 186 Ill. 43, 48 N.E. 191
(1897).
It has been stated that the courts generally follow these four conditions as
set forth in the Restatement, Torts § 339 (1934). Prosser, Torts § 77
(1941); United Zinc Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922). (The attractive
nuisance must attract from off the premises. However, this condition has
been recognized in only a minority of the states. Harper, Torts § 93 (1933).
Luallen v. Woodstock Iron & Steel Corp., 236 Ala. 621, 184 So. 182
(1938); King v. Simons Brick Co., 52 Cal. App. 586, 126 P.2d 627
(1942); Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896); Harriman
v. Incorporated Town of Afton, 225 Iowa 659, 281 N.W. 183 (1938);
Dornick v. Wierton Coal Co., 109 Pa. Super. 400, 167 Atl. 617 (1933).
Peters v. Bowman, supra note 4; Stendal v. Boyd, 73 Minn. 53, 75 N.W.

735 (1898).

Robbins v. Omaha, 100 Neb. 439, 160 N.W. 749 (1916).
See Anderson v. Reith-Riley Const. Co., 112 Ind. App. 170, 44 N.E.2d
184 (1942).
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matic.' 8 Practically speaking, the probability that sharp declivities
will exist in an artificial body of water created by drainage into an
excavation is considerably greater than the possibility that such declivities will be found in a natural formation.' The courts in a limited
number of jurisdictions have allowed recovery in situations closely
analogous to the facts in the principal case' based on the unnatural
hidden dangers involved." In Sanchez v. East Contra Costa Irrigation
Co.," the court stated that even though the children assumed the risk
of a body of water they did not assume the risk of an unknown and
unguarded hole in the bottom of that body. The objection that liability
imposed upon the owner of land would create hardship upon that
owner may be answered by pointing out that all the attractive nuisance doctrine imposes is the duty to exercise reasonable care. The
courts which have allowed recovery in such cases do not appear to
have worked a hardship or to have imposed unreasonable duties upon
land owners.
It is self-evident that a blanket extension of the attractive nuisance
doctrine to include a whole new general field would be indiscreet.
However, a limited application of the doctrine, covering situations
wherein the danger is great and could be easily or inexpensively
remedied, should not be a violation of our historical concepts of property.
Daniel Twitchell

WILLS-DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION-RIGHT OF MURDERER'S HEIRS TO INHERIT FROM VICTIM. A Kentucky statute'
precluded petitioner's father from inheriting property from his pars 92 N.E.2d at 641.
9

See. e.g.. such cases as Sanchez v. East Contra Costa Irrigation Co., 205

Cal. 515, 271 Pac. 1060 (1928) (syphon in bottom of canal); Saxton v.
Plum Orchards, 215 La. 378, 40 So.2d 791 (1949) (steep bank hidden

under water of artificial pond).
10 Coeur d' Alene Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 215 Fed. 8 (9th Cir. 1914)
(child drowned in cistern covered by water); Malloy v. Hibernia Sav. &
Loan Soc., 3 Cal. Unrep. 716, 21 Pac. 525 (1889) (sewage pit); Indianapolis v. Williams, 58 Ind. App. 447, 108 N.E. 387 (1915) (hole in bed
of natural stream caused by sewage discharge; municipal corporation liable
the same as a person if negligent); Indianapolis v. Emmelman, 108 Ind. 530,
9 N.E. 155 (1886) (excavation in bed of natural stream); Saxton v. Plum
Orchards, supra note 9; Tucker v. Draper, 62 Neb. 66, 86 N.W. 917
(1901) (well); Bjork v. City of Tacoma, 76 Wash. 225, 135 Pac. 1005
(1913) (wooden flume with trap door in bottom).
City of Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39 N.E. 484 (1895) (log floating upon pool; where some factor other than the mere existence of the
pool attracts the children there is recovery); Kansas City v. Siese. 71 Kan.
283, 80 Pac. 628 (1905) (structure on pond); Price v. Atchison Water
Co., 58 Kan. 551, 50 Pac. 450 (1897) (structure upon the water).
12 205 Cal. 515, 271 Pac. 1060 (1928).
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 381.280 (1946): "If the . . . heir-at-law . . . takes the
life of the decedent and is convicted therefor of a felony, the person so
convicted forfeits all interest in and to the property of the decedent . . .
and the property interest so forfeited descends to the decedent's other
heirs-at-law, unless otherwise disposed of by the decedent."

